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World War II: Won by American Planes and Ships, or
by the Poor Bloody Russian Infantry?
Mark Harrison*
AbstractThis short paper reviews a new book about World War II. In most suchbooks, what is new is not usually important, and what is important is notnew. This one is an exception. How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and
Allied Victory in World War II, by Phillips Payson O'Brien, sets out a newperspective on the war. An established view is that World War II was decidedon the Eastern front, where multi-million armies struggled for supremacy onland and millions died. According to O’Brien, this neglects the fact that thepreponderance of the Allied productive effort was devoted to building shipsand planes for an air-sea battle that was fought to a limited extent in the Eastand with much higher intensity across the Western and Pacific theatres. TheAllies’ air-sea power framed the outcomes of the great land campaigns bypreventing Germany and Japan from fully realizing their economic potentialsfor war. Finding much to be said for this reinterpretation, I reconsider thetrue significance of the Eastern front.
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World War II: Won by American Planes and Ships, or
by the Poor Bloody Russian Infantry?
How the War Was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II. ByPhillips Payson O'Brien. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. Xx+626 pages.
How the War Was Won provides a new interpretation of the outcome ofWorld War II. The author, Phillips Payson O'Brien, is director of the ScottishCentre for War Studies at the University of Glasgow. His book is welcome,because it is some time since I have come across any serious rethinking ofmajor factors in the war.O'Brien's target is the idea that the Eastern Front was decisive in theoutcome of the war because that is where the biggest land battles werefought and the poor bloody infantry sustained the heaviest human losses. Ihave an interest because I have certainly contributed to this idea, and O’Brienargues that it cannot be right.“There were no decisive battles in World War II,” the book begins (p. 1).The great engagements on the Eastern Front, O’Brien maintains, wereincidental. The war in the east was fought largely in two dimensions along aline of one or two thousand kilometres in width and, at any one time, a fewdozen kilometres in depth. It engaged significant manpower of two states,the Soviet Union and Germany, but only a fraction of the latter's overallfighting power. Most of the belligerents rightly gave priority to another front,that of continuous air-sea engagement. The air-sea battle was hundreds ofkilometres deep and many thousands wide. More than the land battles, it hadthe third dimension of altitude from the seabed to the stratosphere. This wasthe front line where most of the war production of Germany, Britain,America, and Japan was engaged. This, O’Brien concludes, is where and howthe war was won.
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How the War Was Won is based on the author’s research in governmentand private archives in Britain and the United States, and on a voluminoussecondary literature. There are many figures, tables, maps, and photographs.
Table 1. The national priority of air-sea power, 1943/44: air and naval
armament and equipment, per cent of total in each countryCountry Period Per centJapan 1944 (year) 83.2USA 1943 (fourth quarter) 73.7Germany 1944 (July) 65.2UK 1943 (December) 65.1USSR 1944 (year) 32.8Notes: Figures show the procurement of air and naval munitions in eachcountry shown as a proportion of the total. The measure is by value for allcountries except the United Kingdom, where it is by the proportion ofemployees contracted to production for the relevant ministries. For allcountries the value of merchant vessels is excluded; for the USA and Japan itis subtracted from the total before calculating shares. For Germany gunarmament and ammunition for ships and planes is allocated to air and navalarmament. Whether the same division is made for other countries is unclear.Sources: O’Brien (2015), pp. 27 (Germany), 39 (UK), 53 (USA), and 60(Japan); Harrison (1996), p. 00 (USSR).
Two chapters set out the main theses. Chapter 1 documents the prioritythat each country gave to the production of air-sea power in wartime. All themajor powers are fully represented in the narrative, but the most relevantnumerical data omit the Soviet Union. Table 1 collates the author’s figureswith comparable Soviet data for the period around 1943/44, and ranks thefigures in decreasing order. The table shows that all the great powers but onegave at least two thirds of their productive effort to air and naval munitions;in Japan’s extreme case, the proportion was five sixths. The exception is theSoviet Union which allocated only one third of its overall procurementoutlays to air and naval munitions; the other two thirds went to arming andequipping the multi-million Soviet ground forces. No doubt the variationacross the countries can be explained by reference to each country’s strategic
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environment and objectives, and this is a question to which I will return. Fornow, the point is that the average of these figures places the centre of gravityof the war far away from the Eastern front and away from the great landbattles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Kursk.1Chapter 2 shows that most powers suffered most losses of fighting power,direct and indirect, not in particular engagements on the ground but in theuninterrupted air-sea battle that began in 1940. To the direct losses thatarose in combat should be added the indirect losses. These are made up byoutput not produced because of supply disruption (“pre-production losses”)or lost in the course of deployment before it reached the battlefield. “By1944,” O’Brien concludes (p. 87), “only a minority of the war-makingpotential of Japan and Germany was actually able to be put into ‘battle’.” In atwist that appeals to the economist, the air-sea battle not only eroded thefighting power that the losers deployed but also, he argues, helped to decidehow much fighting power each country could produce and bring to the front.The air-sea battle was decisive because it pinned the losers down to a pointwhere their economies could not produce; if they could produce, they couldnot deploy; when deployed, their armies and navies could not move.Chapters 3 and 4 give historical background to the emergence of the airsea battle in 1940. Chapter 3 deals with history; it shows that during the1930s the great powers (other than the Soviet Union) began to assemble themeans and concepts of the air-sea war, but with only the vaguest practicalunderstanding of they were doing. Chapter 4 focuses on the link from ideas
1 The concept of an average implies some kind of relative weighting of thedata points. It is not easy to establish weights for the volumes of warproduction of the five powers. The ultimate constraint on war productionwas the size of the economy, however, and in 1944 the five economies werefully mobilized, so a shortcut method would take into account that in thatyear the British, German, and Soviet economies were of similar size; theJapanese economy was smaller by a substantial margin; and the US economywas as large as all the others combined (Harrison 2005: 140).
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to policies. The architects of the air-sea war are identified. Churchill,Roosevelt, and Stalin emerge surprisingly well. Roosevelt was an earlyconvert; Churchill adopted the same vision on the basis that Britain had noother advantage. Fully committed to the land war, even Stalin understoodthat in wartime the Soviet Union’s first needs were bauxite for airframes andguns for air defence.Two more chapters take the story up to 1943. In Chapter 5 the variouspowers wake up to the needs of the air-sea battle and look for the means toimplement it. In Chapter 6 the Allies decide to attack Germany first, but thenfail to stick to their decision, dispersing effort to the Mediterranean and thePacific. By 1943 the US Navy was deploying an air force against Japan thatwas comparable in size to the entire Luftwaffe. Based on an account of theresources on each side, O’Brien concludes that the Allies could have invadedFrance in 1943 if they made it a priority to do so. He does not say whetherthe failure to do so was a mistake. Perhaps not, given two arguments that aremade elsewhere. First, O’Brien argues, Japan was a much more seriousenemy than is commonly supposed. Second, if the war was decided by theattrition of the air-sea battle, not by big battles on the ground, then in 1943the attrition was still at an early stage.Chapters 7 through 10 deal with aspects of the war that O’Brien regardsas truly decisive: the shipping wars, the bombing offensives, and the closingcombined-arms offensives against Germany and Japan. These chapters do notrequire detailed explanation, although the detail is often fascinating. Alliedlearning was based on trial and error and O’Brien points up many errors inthe conduct of these campaigns. Nonetheless he does not support the viewthat the bomber offensive was a failure. Rather, it destroyed, tied down, orprevented the production and deployment of much more Axis armamentthan was destroyed in the more famous battles on land. O’Brien illustratesthe argument by reference to Operation Crossbow, the Allied air campaign todestroy German V-1 and V-2 production and launch facilities.
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Chapter 11 finishes the story as the German and Japanese war effortsgrind literally to a halt. Deprived of supplies and unable to move, their armiesmust fight to the death or surrender. The means that induced them tosurrender were terrible for their civilians, and O’Brien gives attention to themoral dilemmas that arose.
How the War Was Won will resonate in contemporary Western debates.Russian leaders have used the recent seventieth anniversary of 1945 tocelebrate the Soviet view of the war. This view has three main components.First is Russia as the innocent victim of German aggression, wiping clean theslate of Stalin’s westward expansion in 1939 and 1940. Second is thecentrality of the Eastern front, the scene of a titanic struggle between twogreat armies, Stalin’s Red Army and Hitler’s Wehrmacht, beside which theengagements in other theatres are presented as sideshows. Third is theappalling 25-million toll of military and civilian losses that the Soviet Unionsuffered before the war came to a conclusion. How the War Was Wondiminishes the second and third of these claims. It claims openly that theEastern front was the sideshow. It implies that the terrible Soviet sacrifice,which is undeniable, should not be mistaken for a measure of the Sovietcontribution to victory, which was much less in proportion.The Soviet Union made little contribution to the air-sea battle. Sovietnaval power remained negligible. As for air power, the Soviet economyproduced tens of thousands of aircraft but these put up a disappointing show.Half the combat airplanes produced in wartime were lost in accidents(Krivosheev et al. 1993: 366-367 gives data). Most of the planes that weredeployed were never sent more than a few kilometres into German-heldterritory. German airmen on the Eastern front did not fear them. The Germaninfantrymen learned to fear them, but that was because there were so fewGerman airmen; most of the German air force was committed elsewhere, inthe air-sea battle against the Anglo-American forces.In 2014, we marked the centenary of the first Great War, often seen as apointless, counterproductive struggle in comparison with the second.
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O’Brien’s thinking pushes us to see the two wars as more alike than isgenerally supposed. Both wars arose from tensions between Russia andGermany over the division of Eastern Europe; it turns out that both warswere decided elsewhere, in the West, by the preponderance of armament andequipment that the Allies could throw into the war.Related to this is a similarity in the pattern of attrition. In both warsGermany, with a superior combat organization, could impose greater humanlosses on the Allies than its own armies would suffer. This advantage wasoffset only by a growing Allied preponderance in armament, and especially inair-sea armament. It is true that in 1914 the means of air battle were still ingestation, but they were in production well before 1918 and made an criticalcontribution to the transformation of the battlefield by the end of the war. Inboth world wars, Allied superiority in the emerging air-sea battle facilitatedthe growing mobilization and integration of the Allied war effort, andundermined that of the opposing coalition, driving it apart and eventuallybreaking its resistance. Both wars became wars of attrition in which victorywent not to the last man standing but to the last manned war machines thatcould still move in the air, on water, and on land.How should a former advocate of the priority of the Eastern frontrespond? Was Stalingrad not the turning point of World War II? UntilStalingrad the Red Army was in full retreat. After Stalingrad the Red Armyadvanced continuously. Stalingrad certainly looks decisive, as I once wrote(Barber and Harrison 1991: 40):In the winter of 1942, decisive Allied victories were won at Stalingrad inthe east and at El Alamein in north Africa. The entire battle of Egypt costGermany 75,000 troops, 500 tanks and 1,000 artillery pieces. In the battleof Stalingrad Germany lost 800,000 men (of whom only 90,000 remainedalive at the moment of surrender), 2,000 tanks and 10,000 guns.
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Commenting on the great battles of the Eastern front, O’Brien makes astrong point: the “2,000 tanks and 10,000 guns” lost in six months atStalingrad were not out of proportion to Germany’s annual production andconsumption. But does this not set too low a value on the lost 800,000 men,the broken morale, the vanished dreams? And the territory lost and gained:was the purpose of the war not to recover old territories and take new ones?In order for Stalingrad not to have been decisive, a specific view of war isrequired, one that downplays the control of territory, the value of personnel,and the Schwerpunkt of the advance on the ground. A question is whetherthis view works.According to Clausewitz’s (1968: 104) second reciprocal action, “the aimof all action in War is to disarm the enemy.” O’Brien adapts this to hiscontext: in the twentieth century, he writes, the purpose of war is “to stop theenemy from moving” (p. 488). This, he argues, was the outcome of the air-seabattle: it pinned down the forces of the Axis powers and stopped themmoving. Once the Allies could stop the enemy moving, they had won.But movement and territory go together. The realization of German,Italian, and Japanese war aims required the seizure of territory, and Alliedwar aims required its recovery. The Soviet Union also exploited the war toseize territory, which it kept. Ships and planes, the means of air-sea battle,needed home territories where they could land and be refuelled, reequipped,and redeployed. The means of battle had to be produced somewhere; theoperation of factories and workers required territory on which to locatethem, as the wartime evacuation of Soviet munitions factories reminds us.The air-sea battle may have destroyed the enemy’s capacity to produce anddeploy, but the enemy was not finally disarmed until the poor bloodyinfantry was able to occupy the territory of the enemy’s homeland.
How the War Was Won pushes back against a view that once seemedradical and is now a tired orthodoxy. It makes the point: the war was not wonon the Eastern front alone. But O’Brien pushes beyond this, perhaps too far. Ifthe Soviet Union had lost the war on the Eastern front, the air-sea battle that
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was fought in the Atlantic and Pacific would have become far more difficult.The war would have dragged on. US President Truman would have acquiredthe atomic bomb in very different circumstances and with unknowableconsequences. The Eastern front did matter. So did Japan’s land war in China.The economist in me responds to O’Brien’s message by suggesting arebalancing of our view of the war. For every country, ships, planes, and thepoor bloody infantry were partial substitutes. The need to make the best ofthe war effort impelled each country to equalize the marginal returns to eachinput into fighting power. Their goals and circumstances differed and this ledto different choices, clearly illustrated in Table 1. The figures show twoextremes: while Japan equipped an outstanding navy and air force, the SovietUnion built a vast army. Each country optimized within broad limits thatwere set, among other things, by inter-ally cooperation and exchange(extensive among the Allies, non-existent on the side of the Axis).Optimization implies that marginal returns were equalized across inputs.When returns were successfully equalized within and between the theatres,no one input was decisive, and no one theatre was decisive. Rather thanbeing decided in one theatre above others, or in a few great battles, the warwas decided everywhere at once.
How the War Was Won is a fascinating corrective to deep biases in ourunderstanding of World War II. Readers will value it for its contributions toresearch, to the classroom, and to public debate. Whether or not it goes toofar is likely to be contested, but its contribution will be widely recognized
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